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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge 
 A Pennsylvania jury found Mark Breakiron guilty of 
first-degree murder and robbery for killing a bartender and 
stealing her purse and money bags from the bar.  At the 
penalty phase, the jury found as an aggravating factor that he 
committed the murder “while in the perpetration of a 
felony”—i.e., the robbery.  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(6).  
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The trial court sentenced him to death.  On Breakiron’s 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the District Court 
invalidated the murder conviction (and thus the death 
sentence) because it found that the prosecution withheld 
material evidence regarding one of its witnesses in violation 
of the rule set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963).  The District Court concluded, however, that the 
Brady evidence was not material to Breakiron’s robbery 
conviction and did not disturb it.  
 
 The Commonwealth1 has not appealed the District 
Court’s ruling and states that it is prepared to retry Breakiron 
for murder.  Breakiron appeals the denial of relief from his 
robbery conviction, which, if invalidated, would no longer 
constitute an aggravating factor during any future penalty 
phase.  Breakiron argues that the Brady violations found by 
the District Court require the invalidation of his robbery 
conviction as well, and he raises four other claims addressed 
to that conviction.  We agree with Breakiron on the Brady 
claim and conclude that three of his other claims also warrant 
relief.  Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s 
judgment to the extent that it denied Breakiron’s habeas 
petition as to his robbery conviction and remand for the 
District Court to grant his petition as to that conviction.2 
 
I.     Background 
                                                 
1 For ease of reference, we refer to appellees collectively as 
“the Commonwealth.” 
 
2 Nothing said herein, however, would preclude retrying him 
on this charge as well. 
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Because Breakiron’s murder conviction no longer is at 
issue, we need only briefly summarize the background 
relevant to the issues we address.  On March 24, 1987, 
Breakiron killed Saundra Marie Martin, the bartender of a bar 
called “Shenanigan’s” in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, at which 
he was the night’s last patron.  He also stole her purse and 
bags of money from the bar.  The Commonwealth charged 
him with murder and robbery and tried him before a Fayette 
County jury in April 1988.  As explained in more detail 
below, that jury included a member who had been exposed to 
testimony by another panel member at voir dire that 
Breakiron “used to do a lot of robbing[.]”  (N.T. 448; 
A.717.)3 
 
At trial, Breakiron never denied killing Martin or 
committing theft by stealing the money.  Instead, he put on a 
voluntary intoxication/diminished capacity defense and 
argued that he was guilty of third-degree murder because he 
did not have the specific intent to kill.  He also argued that he 
was guilty of theft, but not robbery, because he decided to 
steal after his attack on Martin was complete.  See 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 3701(a)(1) (defining robbery as, inter alia, 
infliction of injury or use of force “in the course of 
committing a theft”).   
 
The only evidence potentially relevant to that issue 
was the testimony of the Commonwealth’s witness Ellis 
Price, who was incarcerated with Breakiron before 
Breakiron’s trial, and Breakiron’s own testimony.  Price 
testified that, while imprisoned with Breakiron, he and 
                                                 
3 Citations to the record are to the state trial court record and 
the appendix on appeal, respectively. 
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Breakiron had “conversations regarding the offenses with 
which [Breakiron] has been charged,” and that Breakiron 
made “statements . . . regarding whether or not he participated 
in these crimes.”  (N.T. 1112; A.1410.)  Price testified that 
Breakiron “told me that when he was at the bar, that there was 
another guy and girl there.  So, he went into the bathroom to 
hide until they left.”  (N.T. 1114; A.1412.)  According to 
Price, Breakiron told him that he then returned to the bar area 
and asked for another drink.  (Id.)  Martin, however, told him 
that it was closing time and asked him to leave, “so he picked 
up the ashtray and started hitting her.”  (Id.)  Price further 
testified that Breakiron said “[h]e hit her a few times.  She 
wouldn’t go to the floor.  So, he just—he pulled out the knife 
and I don’t know what he did after that.  Then, he drug her 
out to his truck and took her to . . . his pap’s house” and 
“finished her off there.”  (N.T. 1114-15; A.1412-13.) 
 
Breakiron, by contrast, testified that Martin started the 
altercation by hitting him over the head with “something 
heavy” after he put his arm around her.  (N.T. 1253; A.1551.)  
He further testified that he “blacked out,” awoke to find 
Martin with a knife sticking out of her back, left the bar and 
drove away.  (N.T. 1254-55; A.1552-53.)  He then returned to 
the bar, put Martin’s body in his truck, went back into the bar, 
“[a]nd then when I started to leave, I saw two money bags 
laying on the floor to the entrance by the dance floor” and 
“[p]ut them in the back of the truck.”  (N.T. 1260-61; A.1558-
59.)  At closing, Breakiron’s counsel argued that he was not 
guilty of robbery because he decided to steal the money after 
killing Martin.  (N.T. 1260-61; A.1558-59.)  Breakiron’s 
counsel, however, did not request a charge on the lesser-
included offense of theft, and the trial court did not give one. 
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 The jury found Breakiron guilty of first-degree murder 
and robbery.  At the penalty phase, the jury recommended a 
death sentence after finding as an aggravating factor that he 
murdered Martin “while in the perpetration of a felony”—i.e., 
the robbery.  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(6).  (It found as an 
additional aggravating factor that he committed the murder 
“by means of torture.”)  The trial court sentenced Breakiron 
to death on the murder conviction plus five to ten years of 
imprisonment on the robbery conviction.  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court affirmed.  See Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 
571 A.2d 1035 (Pa. 1990).  Breakiron filed a petition under 
Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§§ 9541-9546 (the “PCRA”) in 1996, and the PCRA court 
denied it after holding an evidentiary hearing.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed that ruling as well.  
See Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 729 A.2d 1088 (Pa. 1999) 
(“Breakiron-2”). 
 
 Breakiron then instituted the federal habeas proceeding 
at issue here in 2000.  Shortly thereafter, he filed a second 
PCRA petition in state court.  The PCRA court dismissed it as 
untimely and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed.  See 
Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94 (Pa. 2001) 
(“Breakiron-3”).  The parties then litigated the federal habeas 
petition before three different District Judges for almost seven 
years, during which Breakiron amended his petition several 
times, took discovery, and received an evidentiary hearing.  
Breakiron ultimately asserted eighteen claims, including 
claims addressed to the guilt and penalty phases of his trial 
and to his murder and robbery convictions.  Among them 
were claims that the prosecution withheld evidence in 
violation of Brady that he could have used to impeach Ellis 
Price.  
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 The District Court issued findings of fact on the Brady 
claims on September 19, 2007.  It then issued its opinion and 
order on September 24, 2008, granting relief on three of those 
claims and invalidating the murder conviction.  The District 
Court did not find Price’s testimony relevant to the robbery 
charge, however, so it did not grant relief from the robbery 
conviction on that basis (or any other).  The District Court 
granted Breakiron a certificate of appealability on one claim, 
but the parties agree that it is moot in light of the invalidation 
of his murder conviction and he has not pursued the claim on 
appeal.4  The Commonwealth moved for reconsideration, 
which the District Court denied.  The Commonwealth has not 
appealed and asserts that it is prepared to retry Breakiron for 
murder.  Breakiron appealed and filed a motion to expand the 
certificate of appealability to raise the claims at issue here, 
which we granted. 
 
II.     Analysis 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 
and 2253(a).  Our review of the District Court’s legal 
conclusions is plenary.  See Coombs v. DiGuglielmo, 616 
F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 2010).  Like the District Court’s, our 
review of Breakiron’s claims is governed by the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”).  “AEDPA provides that, where a habeas 
                                                 
4 That claim was that counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
by failing to present mental health evidence in support of 
Breakiron’s diminished capacity/voluntary intoxication 
defense at the guilt phase and in support of mitigation at the 
penalty phase.   
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petitioner’s claim was ‘adjudicated on the merits’ in state 
court, the petition may not be granted unless the state court 
decision ‘was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 
by the Supreme Court of the United States,’ or ‘was based on 
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’”  Simmons 
v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 231 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)).   
 
Under AEDPA, a state court decision is “contrary to” 
established federal law “if the state court reaches a conclusion 
opposite to the Supreme Court’s own conclusion on a 
question of law or decides the case differently where the 
Supreme Court was confronted by a set of materially 
indistinguishable facts.”  McMullen v. Tennis, 562 F.3d 231, 
236 (3d Cir. 2009).  A state court decision is an 
“unreasonable application” of established federal law “if the 
state court unreasonably applies the correct legal rule to the 
particular facts, unreasonably extends a legal principle to a 
new context, or unreasonably refuses to extend the principle 
to a new context where it should apply.”  Id.  This test “‘is an 
objective one—a federal court may not grant habeas relief 
merely because it concludes that the state court applied 
federal law erroneously or incorrectly.’”  Id. (citation 
omitted).  Instead, “[a] state court’s determination that a claim 
lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 
‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the 
state court’s decision.”  Harrington v. Richter, — U.S. —, 
No. 09-587, 2011 WL 148587, at * 11 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2011) 
(quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 
 
Where the state court has not addressed the merits of a 
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claim, and the merits of the claim are properly before us, then 
this deferential standard of review does not apply and we 
instead review the claim de novo.  See Porter v. McCollum, 
130 S. Ct. 447, 452 (2009); Wilson v. Beard, 589 F.3d 651, 
658 (3d Cir. 2009).  In doing so, we nevertheless must 
presume that state-court factual findings are correct unless the 
presumption is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.  
See Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). 
 
 In this case, Breakiron argues that:  (1) the Brady 
violations require relief from his robbery conviction; (2) the 
state trial court improperly precluded him from testifying as 
to when he formed the intent to steal; (3) trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a jury 
charge on the lesser-included offense of theft; (4) trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to take corrective 
action after a venire member testified at voir dire that 
Breakiron “used to do a lot of robbing” and a different 
member of the same panel ended up on Breakiron’s jury; and 
(5) the cumulative effect of these four errors deprived him of 
a fair trial.  We conclude that Breakiron’s Brady claims and 
his two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether 
considered alone or cumulatively, require relief from his 
robbery conviction.5 
                                                 
5 The District Court addressed Breakiron’s claim of 
cumulative error, but limited its analysis to his claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel instead of considering his 
alleged errors of all kinds.  Cf. Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 
103, 138-39 (3d Cir. 2007).  Because we conclude that three 
of Breakiron’s claims individually warrant relief, their 
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A. The Brady Claims 
 Breakiron argues that his robbery conviction must be 
invalidated because the prosecution withheld evidence that he 
could have used to impeach the testimony of Ellis Price.  In 
his second PCRA petition, Breakiron raised several 
Brady claims, including a claim that the prosecution failed to 
disclose that Price had been convicted of an impeachable 
crimen falsi—i.e., a Michigan state conviction of assault with 
the intent to rob.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not 
address this claim on the merits because it held that 
Breakiron’s second PCRA petition was untimely.  See 
Breakiron-3, 781 A.2d at 98, 101.  Breakiron asserted the 
same claim in his habeas petition, which he later amended to 
argue that the prosecution also failed to disclose that Price 
had sought a deal from Breakiron’s prosecutor in exchange 
for his testimony and was a suspect in an investigation 
pending when he testified (in which he ultimately was not 
charged).  The Commonwealth argued in the District Court 
that Breakiron had procedurally defaulted his Brady claims 
and all the other claims he raised in his second PCRA 
petition.  The District Court rejected that argument by order 
entered October 15, 2004, and the Commonwealth has not 
challenged that ruling on appeal.6 
                                                                                                             
cumulative effect necessarily does as well.  In light of our 
disposition, we need not address Breakiron’s second claim. 
 
6 We nevertheless may consider the issue sua sponte.  See 
Smith v. Horn, 120 F.3d 400, 408 (3d Cir. 1997).  In the 
District Court, the Commonwealth argued that the claims 
Breakiron raised in his second PCRA petition were 
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 Thereafter, Breakiron took discovery on his Brady 
claims and the District Court held an evidentiary hearing.  It 
ultimately granted relief from the murder conviction under 
Brady because it concluded that the prosecution failed to 
disclose that Price:  (1) had sought a deal from prosecutors in 
exchange for his testimony against Breakiron; (2) was a 
suspect in another criminal investigation pending at that time; 
and (3) had been convicted of a crimen falsi.  The District 
Court concluded that this evidence was material impeachment 
evidence because Price’s testimony contradicted Breakiron’s 
testimony that he had not intended to kill Martin and was the 
only direct evidence that Breakiron’s attack on Martin was 
intentional.  (Dist. Ct. Op. at 59-61.)  The District Court 
found Price’s testimony irrelevant to the robbery charge, 
                                                                                                             
procedurally defaulted because the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court dismissed it as untimely.  The District Court properly 
rejected that argument because Pennsylvania’s former 
“relaxed waiver” rule in capital cases meant that the PCRA 
statute of limitations did not constitute an adequate and 
independent state-law ground for denying the claims at the 
time of the alleged default.  See Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 
700, 708-10 (3d Cir. 2005).  The Commonwealth also argued 
that the Brady claims Breakiron had not raised in state court 
were unexhausted and now procedurally defaulted as well.  
The District Court agreed, but properly concluded that 
Breakiron necessarily would show “cause and prejudice” to 
excuse the default if his underlying claims had merit (i.e., if 
the prosecution withheld material evidence).  See Banks v. 
Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004) (“cause and prejudice” 
inquiry parallels elements of substantive Brady claim). 
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however, because Price “did not reference the bar’s money 
bags, Martin’s purse, or any statement Breakiron allegedly 
had made to him regarding the intent to steal or the robbery.”  
(Dist. Ct. Op. at 58 & n.25.)  Thus, it did not grant relief from 
the robbery conviction.  Breakiron argues on appeal that the 
prosecution’s suppression of evidence requires relief from 
that conviction as well.7   
 
We agree.  A Brady violation occurs if: (1) the 
evidence at issue is favorable to the accused, because either 
exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the prosecution withheld it; 
and (3) the defendant was prejudiced because the evidence 
was “material.”  See Wilson, 589 F.3d at 659 (citing, inter 
alia, Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)).  In 
                                                 
7 The Commonwealth argues that Breakiron waived this issue 
because he did not meaningfully raise it in the District Court, 
where he focused instead on the effect of the Brady violations 
on his murder conviction.  Although the District Court 
addressed the effect of the Brady evidence on the robbery 
conviction, neither the District Court nor the parties have 
cited any document filed in the District Court actually raising 
that issue.  We nevertheless reach it because the District 
Court did so and the merits are fully briefed.  See Albrecht, 
485 F.3d at 120 (reaching issue that Commonwealth had not 
raised in the District Court because the District Court 
addressed it sua sponte and the merits were fully briefed on 
appeal); see also Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980, 991 (9th Cir. 
2005) (considering materiality of Brady evidence to robbery 
charge, though noting that, “[o]n appeal, [petitioner] 
understandably focuses on the effect of the undisclosed deal 
on his murder conviction”). 
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this case, the Commonwealth has not appealed the District 
Court’s rulings that the evidence at issue was favorable to 
Breakiron or that the prosecution withheld it and does not 
argue that we can or should review those issues on 
Breakiron’s appeal.8  Thus, the only issue on appeal is 
whether the evidence was material to the robbery charge.  See 
Simmons, 590 F.3d at 233-34.  We exercise plenary review 
over that legal issue, see Wilson, 589 F.3d at 657 & n.1, and 
no deference under AEDPA is due because the state courts 
did not adjudicate this claim on the merits, see id. at 658. 
                                                 
8 In this regard the prosecutor has much to answer for.  When 
asked at oral argument why the prosecutor did not disclose 
this material, the Commonwealth conceded that it “seems a 
little strange.”  The Commonwealth also conceded that such 
material would have been disclosed “under the modern rules 
of discovery.”  That response is at once true and insufficient.  
It was so well-established before Breakiron’s trial as to have 
been axiomatic that prosecutors must disclose impeachment 
evidence like that at issue here.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 
405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).  The Commonwealth has not 
otherwise attempted to explain why this material was not 
disclosed or to defend the prosecutor’s failure to disclose it.  
Like the District Court, we are troubled by that failure.  We 
are at a loss to understand why prosecutors, so long after 
Brady became law, still play games with justice and commit 
constitutional violations by secreting and/or withholding 
exculpatory evidence from the defense.  What the District 
Court found, and we declare now, was known and should 
have been revealed—years ago at the commencement of 
Breakiron’s trial, thus obviating the need for all these 
protracted years of litigation. 
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Under Brady, “[e]vidence is material if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if the evidence had been 
disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  Wilson, 589 F.3d at 665 (citing Giglio, 405 U.S. 
at 154).  “‘[T]he question is not whether the defendant would 
more likely than not have received a different verdict with the 
evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, 
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of 
confidence.  A reasonable probability of a different result is 
shown when the government’s evidentiary suppression 
undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’”  Id. 
(quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
  
 The District Court concluded that the prosecution’s 
suppression of impeachment evidence undermines confidence 
in the murder conviction because Price’s testimony supported 
the prosecution’s theory that Breakiron intended to kill 
Martin.  Breakiron argues that Price’s testimony also 
supported the prosecution’s theory that he intended to steal at 
the time he attacked her.  The Commonwealth, by contrast, 
argues that Price’s testimony did not support the robbery 
conviction because he never testified that Breakiron told him 
anything about the theft. 
 
 As an initial matter, the Commonwealth’s argument is 
undercut by the prosecution’s own closing argument, in 
which it expressly argued that Price’s testimony supported the 
robbery charge.  The prosecution argued:  “The second 
element, in the cour[se] of committing a theft, ladies and 
gentlemen. . . .  Ellis Price told you that when Mr. Breakiron 
came back to the bar area that the bartender was counting the 
14 
 
money.”  (N.T. 1335; A.1633.)  When Breakiron’s counsel 
objected that Price had not so testified, the trial court 
instructed:  “The jury will recall the testimony.  The Court 
does not have any recollection of that, but the jury will recall 
what was testified to by Ellis Price.”  (N.T. 1335-36; A.1633-
34.)  Thus, although Price in fact had offered no such 
testimony, and although the trial court’s instruction suggested 
as much, the Commonwealth’s position is at odds with the 
prosecution’s express argument during closing. 
 
 We need not decide whether this point is dispositive, 
however, because we agree with Breakiron that Price’s actual 
testimony supported the robbery charge in three ways. 
 
 First, Breakiron argues that Price’s testimony 
suggested that the incident as a whole was a “premeditated 
and intentional plan,” which contradicted his own testimony 
that he did not intend to steal the money until after he had 
killed Martin, left, and then returned to the bar.  This 
argument is persuasive.  Price opened his testimony by 
testifying that Breakiron told him about his “offenses with 
which he has been charged” and his “crimes,” plural, which 
included the robbery charge.  Price then testified that 
Breakiron said he waited in the bathroom until the other 
patrons left before attacking Martin.  This testimony indicates 
that Breakiron was “lying in wait” and raises an inference that 
the incident as a whole was premeditated. 
 
The Commonwealth nevertheless argues that Price’s 
testimony was not relevant to the robbery charge because he 
never mentioned Breakiron’s theft of the money.  To the 
contrary, it argues that all of the evidence supporting the 
robbery charge came from Breakiron himself, who testified 
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that (1) Martin had possession of the money bags and her 
purse when Breakiron attacked her, and (2) Breakiron later 
took the money bags from the scene.  It further argues that 
this evidence was sufficient to convict for robbery because 
the jury could have inferred the requisite intent from acts 
committed shortly after the killing.  See Commonwealth v. 
Robertson, 463 A.2d 1133, 1136 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).   
 
 That much is true.  As Breakiron argues, however, the 
Brady materiality standard is not a “sufficiency of the 
evidence” test, and instead turns on whether the withheld 
evidence could reasonably “put the whole case in such a 
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”  
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435 & n.8.  Jurors, of course, are entitled 
to draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence 
presented, see United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 537 
(3d Cir. 2010); Commonwealth v. Wright, 328 A.2d 514, 516 
(Pa. 1974), and the trial court so instructed the jury in this 
case (N.T. 1344; A.1642). Just as the jury could have inferred 
that Breakiron intended to steal when he attacked Martin 
because he later took the money, so too could it have drawn 
that inference from Price’s testimony suggesting that the 
incident as a whole was premeditated.  
   
 Second, Breakiron argues that Price’s testimony about 
Breakiron supposedly “finishing off” Martin after he left the 
bar supported the conclusion that he stole the money before 
he killed Martin, and that he thus killed her “in the course of 
committing a theft” and thereby committed robbery.  See 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3701(a)(1)(i).  The Commonwealth counters 
that Breakiron himself testified that he was not sure whether 
Martin was dead when he returned to the bar, and that she 
thus might have been alive when he took the money.  (N.T. 
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1259-60; A.1557-58.)  That argument is beside the point.  
Although Breakiron frames his argument in terms of when he 
“killed” Martin, the relevant consideration under the statute is 
when he used the force that led to her death, not when she 
actually died.  See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3701(a)(1)(i).  
Breakiron testified that the assault was over when he returned 
to the bar and took Martin’s body and the money.  Price 
contradicted that testimony by testifying that Breakiron told 
him he took Martin from the bar and later “finished her off” 
at his “pap’s” house, which would have been after Breakiron 
took the money and thus “in the course of committing” that 
theft.  See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3701(a)(2) (“An act shall be 
deemed ‘in the course of committing a theft’ if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit theft or in flight after the attempt or 
commission.”).  Price’s testimony was the only evidence that 
Breakiron committed the theft during the course of an 
ongoing assault. 
 
 Finally, Breakiron argues that Price’s testimony 
undermined his credibility in general because Price’s account 
differed from his own.  The Commonwealth has not 
addressed this argument, and we agree with Breakiron.  Price 
testified that Breakiron told him a different story than 
Breakiron told the jury.  The District Court held that there is a 
reasonable probability that the jury would have believed 
Breakiron’s account instead of Price’s if the defense had been 
able to impeach Price’s credibility with the undisclosed 
evidence.  Even though Price did not testify directly that 
Breakiron told him anything about the theft, Price’s testimony 
undermined Breakiron’s credibility as a whole.  With no other 
direct evidence on when Breakiron formed the intent to take 
the money, Breakiron’s own credibility was crucial.  
Accordingly, the impeachment evidence that the prosecution 
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withheld was material to the robbery charge and its Brady 
violations require relief from the robbery conviction.9 
 
B. Counsel’s Failure to Request a Theft Instruction 
Breakiron argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing to request a jury instruction on theft, 
which is a lesser-included offense in the charge of robbery.  
See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3701(a)(1); Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 559 A.2d 25, 27 n.2 (Pa. 1989).  We agree.  At 
trial, Breakiron testified that he took the money bags only 
after he left the bar following the assault, returned, put 
Martin’s body in his truck, went back into the bar, and then 
spotted the bags as he was on his way back out.  (N.T. 1260-
61; A.1558-59.)  At closing, his counsel argued that, although 
Breakiron stole the money bags, he was not guilty of robbery 
                                                 
9 The parties have not cited any cases in which a court has 
addressed whether Brady evidence was material to some 
charges but not others.  We have located one case, which is 
informative by comparison.  In Silva, the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit invalidated a murder conviction because 
the prosecution withheld evidence that the defense could have 
used to impeach a witness whose testimony provided the only 
evidence of the defendant’s role in the murder.  See 416 F.3d 
at 990-91.  The court declined to invalidate the defendant’s 
convictions of robbery and other crimes, however, because 
“strong evidence in the record” corroborated that witness’s 
testimony regarding the defendant’s role in those crimes.  Id. 
at 991.  In this case, by contrast, there is no direct evidence of 
record—strong or otherwise—that Breakiron intended to take 
the money at the time he attacked Martin. 
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because he decided to take the money only after Martin was 
dead.  (N.T. 1320-21; A.1618-19.)  The trial court then 
instructed the jury that it could find Breakiron guilty of 
robbery only if it found both that Breakiron committed a theft 
and that he inflicted serious bodily injury on Martin “in the 
course of” committing that theft.  (N.T. 1352-53; A.1650.)10  
                                                 
10 The robbery charge reads in relevant part: 
 
In order to find the defendant guilty of robbery, you 
must be satisfied that the following two elements have 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the 
Commonwealth.  First, that the defendant inflicted 
serious bodily injury on Saundra Marie Martin. . . .  
The second element for robbery is that the defendant 
did so in the course of committing a theft. . . .  As I 
have already indicated, you cannot find the defendant 
guilty of robbery unless you are satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he committed a theft.  A person 
commits a theft if he unlawfully takes the movable 
property of another person with intent to deprive that 
person of it permanently.  You would need to decide in 
this case whether the defendant took money and/or a 
purse which were the movable property of Saundra 
Marie Martin by inflicting serious bodily injury or the 
threat of serious bodily injury or the threat oto [sic] 
commit the crime of murder and that the defendant did 
these acts in the course of committing the theft.  
Basically, members of the jury, there are therefore two 
elements.  First, that the theft occurred or that it 
occurred by infliction of serouus [sic] bodily injury or 
theft as I have explained it to you. 
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Breakiron’s counsel did not request a further instruction that 
the jury could find him guilty solely of the lesser-included 
offense of theft, and the trial court did not give one.   
 
 Breakiron claims that his counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance in that regard.  He raised this claim in his first 
PCRA proceeding.  The PCRA court held an evidentiary 
hearing, at which counsel testified, then rejected the claim on 
the merits.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed.  See 
Breakiron-2, 729 A.2d at 1094-95.  The District Court 
deferred to that ruling under AEDPA, but explained that it 
would deny the claim even under de novo review. 
   
 This claim is governed by the standard set forth in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which 
constitutes “clearly established Federal law” for AEDPA 
purposes.  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000); 
Rainey v. Varner, 603 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2010).  A 
habeas petitioner asserting a claim under Strickland must 
establish two elements.  “First, the defendant must show that 
counsel’s performance was deficient.  This requires showing 
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  In 
evaluating counsel’s performance, “a court must indulge a 
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the 
                                                                                                             
(N.T. 1352-53; A.1650-51.)  As Breakiron notes, the last 
sentence of this charge reads “or” where it should read “and,” 
and thus suggests that theft alone is sufficient to convict of 
robbery.  Breakiron has raised no independent claim for relief 
in this regard on appeal but, as explained below, this 
suggestion informs our assessment of prejudice. 
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wide range of reasonable professional assistance[.]”  Id. at 
689.  Thus, counsel’s performance will be deemed deficient 
only if it “fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.”  Id. at 688.  The question ultimately is 
“whether, in light of all the circumstances, the [challenged] 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance.”  Id. at 690.   
 
“Second, the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense.  This requires showing 
that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”  Id. at 
687.  To establish prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id. at 
694. 
 
1. Counsel’s Performance 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not address the 
issue of performance and instead rejected this claim solely on 
the ground that Breakiron failed to show prejudice.  See 
Breakiron-2, 729 A.2d at 1094-95.  The District Court also 
did not address counsel’s performance.  Nevertheless, we 
may do so in the first instance because the record is 
adequately developed.  See Hodge v. United States, 554 F.3d 
372, 379 n.9 (3d Cir. 2009).  We will review the issue de 
novo because the state court did not address it.  See Porter, 
130 S. Ct. at 452. 
 
 We conclude that counsel’s failure to request a theft 
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instruction was objectively unreasonable.  As Breakiron 
argues, he would have been entitled under Pennsylvania law 
to an instruction on the lesser-included crime of theft if 
counsel had requested one because the charge was supported 
by the evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Polimeni, 378 A.2d 
1189, 1192 & nn.3-4 (Pa. 1977) (citing, inter alia, Keeble v. 
United States, 412 U.S. 205, 213 (1973)); see also Beck v. 
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 635-36 & n.12 (1980) (counting 
Pennsylvania among the states that have “unanimously” so 
held and citing Commonwealth v. Terrell, 393 A.2d 1117 (Pa. 
1978)).11  The Commonwealth does not argue otherwise. 
   
The Commonwealth also does not defend counsel’s 
performance on this point, and it is apparent from the record 
that counsel did not have a strategic reason for not requesting 
a theft instruction.  When asked at the PCRA hearing whether 
he ever considered doing so, he answered merely “I don’t 
believe so.”  (N.T. PCRA 7/17/97 PM at 70; A.1892.)  Thus, 
the record establishes that counsel’s decision not to request a 
theft instruction was not the kind of strategic choice entitled 
to deference under Strickland.  See Thomas v. Varner, 428 
F.3d 491, 499-500 (3d Cir. 2005).  
  
The record also establishes that it was objectively 
                                                 
11 Breakiron argues that instructions on lesser-included 
offenses that are supported by the evidence are required by 
the Due Process Clause as well.  See Beck, 447 U.S. at 637, 
638 n.14; Vujosevic v. Rafferty, 844 F.2d 1023, 1027 (3d Cir. 
1988).  Because Breakiron has not raised an independent due 
process claim, and because he would have been entitled to a 
theft instruction if requested under Pennsylvania law, we need 
not address that issue. 
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unreasonable.  Counsel’s sole theory of defense to the 
robbery charge was that Breakiron had committed a theft but 
not a robbery.  Without a theft instruction, the jury was left 
with only two choices—conviction of robbery or outright 
acquittal.  In such all-or-nothing situations, “‘[w]here one of 
the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the 
defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely 
to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction.’”  Beck, 447 U.S. 
at 634 (quoting Keeble, 412 U.S. at 212-13).  Thus, even 
though juries are obligated “‘as a theoretical matter’” to 
acquit if they do not find every element of a crime, there is a 
“‘substantial risk that the jury’s practice will diverge from 
theory’” when it is not presented with the option of 
convicting of a lesser offense instead of acquitting outright.  
Id. (quoting Keeble, 412 U.S. at 212).  By conceding theft but 
not requesting a theft instruction, Breakiron’s counsel 
exposed him to that “substantial risk,” and the record reveals 
that he had no strategic reason for doing so.   
 
Nor could there have been any.  Counsel did not 
pursue an all-or-nothing strategy at trial by arguing that 
Breakiron had not committed any crime.  Instead, he 
conceded that Breakiron had committed theft, but neglected 
to request the theft instruction that not only would have been 
consistent with that theory of defense but would have given 
the jury an opportunity to effectuate it.  Under the 
circumstances, no reasonable counsel would have failed to 
request that instruction.  See Richards v. Quarterman, 566 
F.3d 553, 569-70 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that failure to 
request a lesser-included-offense instruction consistent with 
theory of the defense “fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness”); cf. Lopez v. Thurmer, 594 F.3d 584, 588 
(7th Cir. 2010) (holding that decision not to request lesser-
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included-offense instruction “appears to have been strategic” 
where instruction would have been inconsistent with 
defendant’s testimony that he “was innocent of any crime”). 
 
2. Prejudice 
 To show prejudice, Breakiron must establish that there 
is a reasonable probability that the jury would have convicted 
him of theft only and not of robbery if counsel had requested 
the theft instruction to which he was entitled.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Breakiron had not 
made that showing.  Thus, under AEDPA, we may not grant 
relief on this claim unless that ruling either was “contrary to, 
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 
of the United States[.]”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  If we 
determine that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling was 
contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland, then 
we still must review the claim de novo to determine whether 
Breakiron is entitled to relief.  See Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 
F.3d 700, 724 (3d Cir. 2005).  
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s prejudice analysis 
reads in relevant part: 
 
We find that even if this argument had merit 
and that trial counsel could have requested a 
theft and a robbery jury charge, Breakiron 
cannot establish that he was prejudiced. 
 
The charge of the trial court instructed the jury 
not to return a guilty verdict of robbery without 
first finding that a theft had occurred.  (N.T. at 
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1352-54)  Moreover, trial counsel argued to the 
jury during closing argument that there could be 
no robbery, but solely a theft because Breakiron 
took money only after Ms. Martin was dead.  
(N.T. at 1312, 1320-21)  The jury rejected this 
argument and convicted Breakiron of robbery.  
In Breakiron I, we held that the evidence 
supported this verdict because there was no 
question that Breakiron took the victim’s purse 
and the bags of money from the bar.  Breakiron 
I, 524 Pa. at 296-97, 571 A.2d at 1042.  Had a 
theft instruction been given, it is not likely that 
the jury would have returned a verdict only on 
the theft charge. 
 
Breakiron-2, 729 A.2d at 1095.  Thus, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court rejected this claim because (1) the trial court’s 
instruction made it clear that Breakiron was not guilty of 
robbery based on a theft alone, so the jury necessarily rejected 
counsel’s argument that Breakiron committed theft alone, and 
(2) the evidence of robbery was sufficient.12 
 
 Breakiron challenges both rationales, arguing that the 
first is an “unreasonable application” of Strickland and that 
the second is “contrary to” Strickland.  We agree on both 
counts.  First, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned that 
                                                 
12 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court went on to find no 
prejudice at the penalty phase because the jury found another 
aggravating circumstance in addition to the robbery.  See id.  
That issue is no longer relevant given the District Court’s 
invalidation of the murder conviction and death sentence. 
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the jury would have found Breakiron guilty of robbery even if 
a separate theft instruction had been given because the trial 
court’s instruction made clear that theft alone was not enough 
to convict of robbery, and the jury thus necessarily rejected 
Breakiron’s argument that he committed theft alone.  This 
reasoning is a significant stretch of plausibility.  The problem 
with this analysis is that it rests solely on the jury’s duty “‘as 
a theoretical matter’” to acquit if it does not find every 
element of a crime and does not acknowledge the 
“‘substantial risk that the jury’s practice will diverge from 
theory’” when it is not presented with the option of 
convicting of a lesser offense instead of acquitting outright.  
Beck, 447 U.S. at 634 (quoting Keeble, 412 U.S. at 212).  The 
crux of Breakiron’s claim of prejudice is that he was exposed 
to this “substantial risk,” but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
did not acknowledge it.13 
 
 Second, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also noted 
that the evidence of robbery was “sufficient” because 
Breakiron admitted taking money from the bar.  Breakiron 
argues that it was contrary to Strickland to rely on the mere 
sufficiency of the evidence of robbery because the only 
relevant question is whether there was a “reasonable 
probability” that the jury would have convicted him only of 
                                                 
13 Breakiron has not argued that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application 
of Beck and Keeble themselves, but the principles set forth in 
those decisions are relevant in evaluating the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s assessment of prejudice.  Cf. Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 695 (“The governing legal standard plays a crucial 
role in defining the question to be asked in assessing the 
prejudice from counsel’s errors.”). 
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theft instead.  The District Court rejected this argument 
because (1) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not rely 
solely on the sufficiency of the evidence, and (2) it is proper 
to consider the weight of the evidence in assessing prejudice 
under Strickland.  (Dist. Ct. Op. at 94-95.)   
 
 The District Court is right that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court did not solely rely on the sufficiency of the 
evidence, and thus did not apply a “sufficiency of the 
evidence” standard that is contrary to the “reasonable 
probability” standard set forth in Strickland.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s partial reliance on the 
sufficiency of the evidence, however, is nevertheless 
problematic.  It is of course true that courts must weigh the 
evidence in assessing prejudice.  See Buehl v. Vaughn, 166 
F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
695).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, merely 
noted the sufficiency of the evidence without examining its 
weight.  It did not weigh all the evidence of record (including 
Breakiron’s testimony that he took the bags of money only 
after spotting them after the assault was over) to determine 
whether there was a reasonable probability that the jury 
would have convicted him only of theft if it had been given 
that option.  Merely noting that the evidence was sufficient to 
convict does not accomplish that task.  In sum, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not acknowledge the 
substantial risk to which Breakiron was exposed in the 
absence of a theft instruction and did not weigh the evidence 
of record to determine whether it prejudiced him.  Thus, its 
ruling is both contrary to and an unreasonable application of 
Strickland. 
 
 The question remains whether Breakiron suffered 
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prejudice when the issue is considered de novo.  Breakiron 
argues that the failure to request a theft instruction deprived 
the jury of the only way to give effect to counsel’s theory of 
defense (i.e., that Breakiron committed a theft but not a 
robbery).  The District Court reasoned that it would deny this 
claim even considered de novo essentially for the same reason 
as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: the trial court properly 
instructed the jury on the elements of robbery, so the jury 
must have found those elements and not merely a theft in 
finding Breakiron guilty.  (Dist. Ct. Op. at 95-96.)  Thus, 
under the District Court’s reasoning, counsel’s failure to 
obtain a theft instruction did not deprive the jury of a way of 
giving effect to counsel’s argument because the jury could 
have done so simply by finding Breakiron not guilty of 
robbery.   
 
 Like the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, the 
District Court did not account for the substantial risk that a 
jury will convict of an unproven offense when the defendant 
is guilty of some crime but the jury instructions present it 
with an all-or-nothing choice.  See Beck, 447 U.S. at 634.  
The question in assessing prejudice is whether there is a 
reasonable probability that the jury did so here, and we 
conclude that there is.  Breakiron testified that he did not 
decide to take the money bags until after his assault on Martin 
was complete and he left and then returned to the bar.  The 
only evidence to the contrary was the mere fact that he took 
the money and Price’s testimony suggesting that the incident 
as a whole was premeditated and that Breakiron took the 
money before his assault on Martin was complete.  Thus, 
although Price’s testimony supported the robbery charge for 
Brady purposes and the evidence was sufficient to convict, 
the prosecution’s evidence on that charge was not particularly 
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strong and was far from overwhelming.  Moreover, the 
robbery instruction actually given by the trial court, though 
initially proper, compounded the error by closing with the 
erroneous suggestion that the jury could convict Breakiron of 
robbery on the basis of a theft alone.  Under the 
circumstances, there is a reasonable probability that the jury 
would have convicted Breakiron only of theft if the jury 
instructions had given it that option.14 
 
C. Counsel’s Failure to Take Corrective  
Action at Voir Dire 
Finally, Breakiron argues that his counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance in failing to take corrective action after 
a venire member testified that Breakiron “used to do a lot of 
robbing.”  During voir dire, a venire member (Charles Gerba, 
No. 67) testified under oath in front of the panel that he knew 
Breakiron and that Breakiron had committed robberies: “I 
know the boy.  I lived in the terrace and he used to do a lot of 
robbing there.”  (N.T. 448; A.717.)  Gerba also testified that, 
based on what he knew, he had a “fixed opinion” about the 
case and could not be an impartial juror, and the trial court 
excused him.  (Id.)  Breakiron’s counsel did not object to 
Gerba’s testimony or move to strike the venire panel or for a 
                                                 
14 Breakiron also argues that he was prejudiced by the 
absence of a theft instruction because the robbery charge did 
not include a so-called “afterthought” instruction—i.e., an 
instruction emphasizing that he could not be guilty of robbery 
if he committed theft only as an “afterthought” following the 
murder.  In his reply brief, Breakiron clarifies that this 
argument is not an independent claim for relief, so we need 
not address it.  (Breakiron Reply Br. at 19-20.) 
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mistrial, and the trial court took no corrective action sua 
sponte.  One of the venire members on the same panel who 
was in the room at the time (Paul Manges, No. 114) ended up 
serving on Breakiron’s jury.   
 
The trial court opened voir dire by questioning the 
venire members regarding their general knowledge of the 
parties and the case.  Before reaching Gerba, the trial court 
conducted its initial questioning of Manges.  The trial court 
asked him whether he had formed any opinion about the case 
from what he had read in the newspaper.  Manges testified 
that he had not and agreed that he could decide the case 
“solely on the basis of what transpires in this room[.]”  (N.T. 
444-45; A.713-714.)  The trial court later questioned Gerba, 
who testified that Breakiron “used to do a lot of robbing.”  
After the trial court excused Gerba, counsel questioned the 
venire members left on the panel, including Manges, but 
neither counsel nor the trial court asked Manges about 
Gerba’s statement.  (N.T. 512-20; A.781-89.) 
 
 Breakiron argues that his counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing to move to strike the venire panel, seek a 
mistrial, or take other corrective action to insure that no one 
exposed to Gerba’s statement served on the jury.  Breakiron 
raised this claim during his first PCRA proceeding.  The 
PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing, at which his counsel 
testified.  It then denied the claim on the merits, and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed.  See Breakiron-2, 729 
A.2d at 1093-94.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court based its 
ruling solely on the issue of counsel’s performance.  The 
District Court deferred to that ruling under AEDPA, but also 
explained that it would deny the claim on de novo review of 
the issue of prejudice as well. 
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1. Counsel’s Performance 
  As the Supreme Court recently emphasized, the 
standard for evaluating counsel’s performance under 
Strickland “is a most deferential one” that, under AEDPA, 
becomes “‘doubly’” deferential when a state court already has 
found counsel’s performance constitutionally sufficient.  
Harrington, 2011 WL 148587, at *13 (quoting Knowles v. 
Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420 (2009)).  Thus, we may 
not grant relief on this claim unless we conclude, not only 
that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable, but 
that “there is no possibility fairminded jurists could 
disagree[.]”  Id. at *12.  Even under this doubly deferential 
standard, we conclude that counsel’s failure to take corrective 
action was objectively unreasonable and that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland 
in concluding otherwise.   
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that 
counsel’s decision not to move to strike the venire panel or 
for a mistrial was part of a reasonable trial strategy.  Its 
reasoning reads in full:   
 
Under these circumstances, a motion to 
strike the jury panel may have been an 
appropriate course of action.  Nonetheless, trial 
counsel is not ineffective for failing to do so.  
At the PCRA hearing, trial counsel testified that 
he did not make a motion to strike or move for a 
mistrial because the seated juror had stated that 
he could render an unbiased opinion, and 
consequently there was no basis to strike the 
31 
 
panel or move for a mistrial.  The PCRA court 
found that this was a plausible trial tactic, and 
therefore Breakiron failed to meet his burden 
that counsel’s actions were not reasonably 
based.   
 
After reviewing the jury voir dire of the 
juror in question, we agree with the PCRA 
court, and find that trial counsel had a 
reasonable basis for his actions.  The juror 
stated that he could be a fair and unbiased juror, 
and that no one spoke of the case in his 
presence.  The PCRA court did not err in 
denying Breakiron’s petition.  
 
Breakiron-2, 729 A.2d at 1094 (citations and footnotes 
omitted).  Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded 
that counsel’s belief that Manges could be fair and impartial 
was a strategic reason for allowing him on the jury and that 
counsel’s belief was reasonably supported by the record.  
Breakiron argues that this ruling was “based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(2), because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
misread the PCRA and voir dire transcripts.  He also argues 
that its ruling was an unreasonable application of Strickland.  
  
 We agree that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
characterization of the record is not entirely accurate.  It 
based its ruling on two factual determinations.  First, it 
concluded that counsel testified at the PCRA hearing that the 
reason he did not take corrective action was that “the seated 
juror had stated that he could render an unbiased opinion.”  
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Breakiron-2, 729 A.2d at 1094.  Counsel did not actually 
testify that he took no corrective action because Manges 
“stated that he could render an unbiased opinion.”  Counsel’s 
actual testimony, in relevant part, was: 
 
 A. Why didn’t I ask for a mistrial at that point? 
 
Q. Yes, sir. 
 
A. Well, he was — that juror [apparently 
Gerba] was excused and —  
  
 * * * * * 
 
A. I don’t know why there was no request 
for a mistrial at that time, other than the 
fact that this guy [apparently Gerba] was 
excused, and I believe that we 
questioned all of the jurors individually 
after that.  The court had asked several 
questions based on what Mr. Manges 
said, number 114, after consultation with 
Mr. Breakiron, we felt that he would be a 
fair and impartial juror toward Mr. 
Breakiron. 
 
(N.T. PCRA 7/17/97 P.M. at 75-76; A.1897-98.)  Thus, 
counsel testified merely that he “felt” Manges would be a fair 
and impartial juror, not that Manges actually said he could or 
that he declined to take corrective action on that basis.   
 
 Second, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded 
that Manges’s testimony at voir dire made counsel’s decision 
33 
 
reasonable because its own review of the voir dire transcript 
confirmed that “[t]he juror stated that he could be a fair and 
unbiased juror[.]”  Breakiron-2, 729 A.2d at 1094.  Manges 
actually never testified that he could be a “fair and impartial 
juror,” either in the abstract or in light of Gerba’s statement.  
Under initial questioning by the trial court, Manges testified 
merely that he had not formed a fixed opinion from what he 
read in the newspapers and agreed that he could judge the 
case “solely on the basis of what transpires in this room[.]”  
(N.T. 444-45; A.713-14.)  That questioning referred only to 
Manges’s exposure to newspaper articles, and it occurred 
before Gerba made the statement at issue here (which, of 
course, “transpire[d] in th[at] room”).  Manges also did not 
state that he could be a “fair and impartial juror” in response 
to counsel’s questioning after Gerba testified.  Manges did 
testify that he had not formed an opinion as to Breakiron’s 
guilt or innocence, but only when asked whether he had done 
so on the specific bases of reading the newspaper or 
discussing the case with his wife.  (N.T. 512-13; A.781-82.)  
And again, neither counsel nor the trial court asked him about 
Gerba’s statement. 
 
 Even if we assume that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s factual findings are entitled to deference under 
AEDPA, however, we still conclude that its ultimate ruling is 
objectively unreasonable.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
concluded that counsel’s decision to allow Manges on the 
jury was a reasonable strategic decision because counsel 
believed that Manges could be fair and impartial.  The 
primary problem with that conclusion is that counsel could 
have had no reasonable basis for that belief because neither 
he nor the trial court questioned Manges about Gerba’s 
statement.  Counsel’s “feeling” that Manges could be fair and 
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impartial despite that statement thus was insufficiently 
informed.  Cf. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (“[C]ounsel has a 
duty to make reasonable investigations or make a reasonable 
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”).   
 
 In addition, counsel’s testimony does not explain why 
he took no action when Gerba made the statement in the first 
place.  His initial testimony on that point was “I don’t know 
why there was no request for a mistrial at that time[.]”  (N.T. 
PCRA 7/17/97 P.M. at 75; A.1897.)  Manges’s answers to the 
trial court’s questioning provided no basis not to do so 
because the trial court questioned Manges before Gerba made 
his statement.  
  
 Counsel later testified that he did not move for a 
mistrial because he did not think “that anything egregious had 
occurred” during jury selection.  (N.T. PCRA 7/18/97 A.M. at 
36; A.2021).  That statement could mean that counsel did not 
believe anything “egregious” had occurred in light of his and 
the trial court’s questioning of Manges, in which case it 
suffers from the same deficiencies just discussed.  That 
statement could also mean that counsel did not believe that 
the panel’s exposure to Gerba’s testimony itself was 
sufficiently “egregious” to warrant corrective action.  Either 
way, there is no reasonable basis to conclude that counsel’s 
performance in this regard was constitutionally adequate.   
 
Manges was exposed to sworn testimony that 
Breakiron “used to do a lot of robbing”—i.e., that Breakiron 
had a history of committing the very same crime of which he 
was accused at trial.  Federal courts have long recognized that 
evidence suggesting a propensity to commit crimes is patently 
prejudicial.  See, e.g., Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 
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172, 181 (1997) (explaining that propensity evidence “‘is said 
to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them 
as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a 
fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge’”) 
(quoting Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 
(1948)); Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 127 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(“Evidence that a defendant has committed prior criminal acts 
is highly prejudicial.”).  As we have explained, when 
evidence suggesting “a propensity or disposition to commit 
crime . . . reaches the attention of the jury, it is most difficult, 
if not impossible, to assume continued integrity of the 
presumption of innocence.  A drop of ink cannot be removed 
from a glass of milk.”  Government of the Virgin Islands v. 
Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 283 (3d Cir. 1976).   
 
Such evidence is all the more prejudicial where, as 
here, it reveals that the defendant previously committed the 
very kind of crime of which he or she stands accused.  See 
Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 185 (“Where a prior conviction was 
for a . . . crime . . . similar to the other charges in a pending 
case, the risk of unfair prejudice would be especially 
obvious[.]”); United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 488 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (“To allow evidence of a prior conviction of the 
very crime for which a defendant is on trial may be 
devastating in its potential impact on a jury. . . .  [W]here, as 
here, the prior conviction is sufficiently similar to the crime 
charged, there is a substantial risk that all exculpatory 
evidence will be overwhelmed by a jury’s fixation on the 
human tendency to draw a conclusion which is impermissible 
in law: because he did it before, he must have done it 
again.”).   
 
The Pennsylvania courts have long recognized the 
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prejudicial nature of propensity evidence as well.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Harkins, 328 A.2d 156, 157-58 (Pa. 1974) 
(“When the jury learns that the person being tried has 
previously committed another crime, the prejudicial impact 
cannot be considered insignificant. ‘The presumed effect of 
such evidence is to predispose the minds of the jurors to 
believe the accused guilty, and thus effectually to strip him of 
the presumption of innocence.’”) (citation omitted).  The 
situation in Harkins was similar to that presented here.  In 
Harkins, a potential juror testified during voir dire that the 
defendant had stolen his car, and the defendant’s counsel 
moved to strike the venire panel.  The trial court denied the 
motion and, though it excused that venire member, other 
members of the same panel went on to serve on the 
defendant’s jury, which ultimately convicted him.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the conviction and 
remanded for a new trial, explaining that “‘[t]he fact that a 
reasonable inference of a prior criminal record is present in 
the minds of the jurors in and of itself mandates a new trial.’”  
Id. at 158 (quoting Commonwealth v. Allen, 292 A.2d 373, 
376 (Pa. 1972)).  Thus, as Breakiron argues, it would have 
been obvious to any reasonably competent counsel that 
corrective action was both available under Pennsylvania law 
and essential to preserve Breakiron’s presumption of 
innocence.15  
  
Counsel, however, took no such action.  He declined to 
                                                 
15 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court appears to have assumed 
that counsel would have received corrective action if he had 
requested it, see Breakiron-2, 729 A.2d at 1094 (citing 
Harkins), and the Commonwealth has not argued otherwise. 
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do so, he testified, because he “felt” that Manges could be fair 
and impartial and did not believe that anything “egregious” 
had occurred.  But avoidance of “egregiousness” is not the 
standard for constitutionally adequate performance; the 
standard is one of objectively reasonable performance under 
the circumstances.  No objectively reasonable counsel would 
fail to recognize the patently prejudicial nature of testimony 
that Breakiron “used to do a lot of robbing” (which certainly 
qualifies as “egregious” in any event), and counsel provided 
no legitimate explanation for failing to take corrective action 
following that testimony.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
nevertheless accepted counsel’s explanation at face-value 
without recognizing that it was insufficiently informed and 
without acknowledging the patently prejudicial nature of 
Gerba’s testimony.  For these reasons, we conclude both that 
counsel’s performance was deficient under Strickland and 
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s conclusion to the 
contrary was objectively unreasonable.16 
 
2. Prejudice 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not reach the 
issue of prejudice, so the District Court reviewed it de novo 
and we will do the same.  See Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 452.  The 
District Court concluded that Breakiron had not shown 
prejudice because, after Gerba made the statement at issue, 
Manges testified that he had not formed any opinion 
                                                 
16 Although Breakiron’s claim in this regard is one of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, we are surprised and 
troubled that the state trial court took no steps to address this 
patently prejudicial exposure sua sponte. 
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regarding Breakiron’s guilt and that he understood that 
Breakiron was presumed innocent unless proven guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Dist. Ct. Op. at 35.)  The 
District Court further reasoned that nothing in these responses 
led counsel or the trial court to question Manges’s 
impartiality.  (Id.)  Thus, the District Court concluded that 
“Breakiron has failed to show that Juror 114 [Manges] was 
anything but a fair and impartial juror or that his presence on 
the jury prejudiced him.”  (Id.)   
 
 Although the parties have not squarely addressed it, 
this claim raises the threshold issue of how prejudice should 
be assessed in this context.  The District Court appeared to 
require some indication that Gerba’s statement actually 
rendered Manges biased or partial as a subjective matter, and 
the Commonwealth too argues that Breakiron failed to 
“establish” that Manges was anything other than fair and 
impartial.  Thus, the District Court’s reasoning and the 
Commonwealth’s argument assume that a subjective 
approach to prejudice is appropriate in this case.  Breakiron, 
by contrast, focuses on the prejudicial nature of the statement 
in question and assumes that its probable effect should be 
determined objectively.  See Hummel v. Rosenmeyer, 564 
F.3d 290, 303 (3d Cir. 2009) (“It is not necessary that the 
defendant show that the deficient conduct ‘more likely than 
not altered the outcome in the case,’” but only that there is a 
“‘reasonable probability’” that it did.) (quoting Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 693, and adding emphasis).  We agree that 
Strickland requires an objective inquiry here. 
 
 The parties have not cited, and we have not located, 
any authority squarely addressing the standard for prejudice 
when counsel is alleged to have rendered ineffective 
39 
 
assistance in connection with statements made during voir 
dire that potentially rendered one or more actual jurors biased 
or partial.  Claims of juror bias or partiality themselves 
generally require a showing of actual or legally implied bias.  
See, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982) (“This 
Court has long held that the remedy for allegations of juror 
partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the 
opportunity to prove actual bias.”).  Some courts have 
required petitioners to show actual or legally implied juror 
bias in similar contexts in order to satisfy the Strickland 
standard as well.  See, e.g., Sanders v. Norris, 529 F.3d 787, 
790-94 (8th Cir. 2008) (no prejudice from counsel’s likely 
deficient voir dire questioning where no actual or legally 
implied juror bias); Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 775-76 
(9th Cir. 2007) (citing Strickland standard but holding that 
defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s deficient 
questioning during voir dire where habeas evidentiary hearing 
revealed that juror was not actually biased).  The District 
Court and the Commonwealth both assume without 
explanation that this subjective approach is the proper one in 
this case. 
 
 Evidence of a juror’s subjective bias or lack thereof 
may well be relevant in some cases involving allegations of 
ineffective assistance at voir dire.  The narrow question 
presented here, however, is the standard for assessing 
prejudice when a panel member who ultimately serves on the 
jury is exposed to sworn testimony that the defendant 
previously committed crimes.  Applying a subjective rather 
than an objective standard of prejudice in this context would 
conflict with Strickland.  The proper inquiry under Strickland 
is not whether Gerba’s statement actually rendered Manges 
biased or partial, but whether there is a reasonable probability 
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that a juror who had not been exposed to that statement would 
have voted to acquit Breakiron of robbery.  See Saranchak v. 
Beard, 616 F.3d 292, 309 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that state 
court improperly considered likely effect of evidence on the 
“particular [trial] judge . . . rather than considering, more 
abstractly, the effect the same evidence would have had on an 
unspecified, objective fact-finder, as required by Strickland”) 
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695).  Indeed, “evidence about 
the actual process of decision, if not part of the record of the 
proceeding under review, . . . should not be considered in the 
prejudice determination.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.  Thus, 
Breakiron was not required to show that Manges was actually 
influenced by Gerba’s statement, but had only to show a 
reasonable probability that any given juror would have 
been.17 
 
 Although we have not applied Strickland in this 
precise context, determining the objectively probable effect of 
prior-crimes evidence is hardly a novel task.  We have 
                                                 
17 The District Court reasoned that Breakiron could not show 
prejudice because Manges’s voir dire testimony suggested 
that he could decide the case fairly.  If counsel or the trial 
court had questioned Manges about Gerba’s statement, and if 
Manges had testified that he could and would disregard it, 
then the District Court’s reasoning might have more force 
(though we do not so hold).  But neither counsel nor the trial 
court questioned Manges about Gerba’s statement, so there is 
no record evidence bearing on whether Manges was actually 
influenced by that statement.  Under the circumstances, 
Strickland requires that we assess its reasonably probable 
effect. 
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applied Strickland’s “reasonable probability” standard in 
assessing the effect of counsel’s failure to object at trial to 
testimony revealing that the defendant had a criminal record, 
see Carpenter v. Vaughn, 296 F.3d 138, 150-51 (3d Cir. 
2002), counsel’s failure to object to evidence concerning a 
defendant’s prior crimes, see Buehl, 166 F.3d at 175-76, and 
counsel’s failure to request a limiting instruction regarding 
evidence of a defendant’s prior crimes, see Albrecht, 485 
F.3d at 128-29.  We also have applied an objective standard 
in assessing the effect of references to a defendant’s prior 
crimes in a variety of other contexts.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Morena, 547 F.3d 191, 194-97 (3d Cir. 2008) (prosecutor’s 
reference to defendant’s uncharged criminal activity); Toto, 
529 F.2d at 283 (evidence of prior crimes).18  The case before 
us thus calls for nothing more than a straightforward 
application of Strickland’s “reasonable probability” standard. 
                                                 
18 In Toto, the trial court improperly admitted evidence of 
prior criminal acts.  In assessing whether the error was 
harmful, we asked “‘whether the error itself had substantial 
influence (on the minds of the jury.)  If so, or if one is left in 
grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.’”  Toto, 529 F.2d at 
283 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 
(1946)).  We further noted that this test required us to “resort 
to probabilities” and determine its probable effect in light of 
the other evidence presented.  Id.  The Supreme Court later 
adopted the Kotteakos standard we applied in this context as 
the standard for determining harmless error on collateral 
review, see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993), 
and, as we have noted, “Strickland prejudice and Brecht 
harmless error are essentially the same standard[.]”  Albrecht, 
485 F.3d at 139 (citing Whitney v. Horn, 280 F.3d 240, 258-
59 & n.18 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
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 Having clarified the proper standard, we have no 
difficulty in concluding that it is satisfied in this case.  As 
explained above, the prosecution’s case on the robbery 
charge, though sufficient, was far from overwhelming.  There 
was little evidence of record to rebut Breakiron’s testimony 
and argument that he decided to commit theft only after the 
assault was complete and thus was not guilty of robbery.  One 
of his jurors, however, had been exposed to sworn testimony 
that Breakiron “used to do a lot of robbing.”  As explained 
above, such propensity evidence is patently prejudicial.  
Indeed, exposure to such testimony may be so prejudicial that 
it cannot be cured even by a proper limiting instruction, 
which was neither requested nor given here.  See Morena, 
547 U.S. at 196-97; Toto, 529 F.2d at 283.  Given the dearth 
of evidence on the robbery charge and the patently prejudicial 
nature of Gerba’s sworn testimony that Breakiron “used to do 
a lot of robbing,” there is a reasonable probability that 
corrective action by counsel would have produced a different 
result.  Cf. Albrecht, 485 F.3d at 128-29 (although issue was 
“a very close one,” defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s 
failure to request a limiting instruction regarding evidence of 
prior crimes because there was “ample” evidence of his guilt). 
 
III.     Conclusion 
 Although our review and opinion, as they must, focus 
on the procedural aspects of Breakiron’s trial, three essential 
factors remain central and cannot be marginalized: a woman 
named Saundra Marie Martin is dead; money was stolen from 
the owner of “Shenanigan’s”; and Mark Breakiron must 
respond for the horrible sequence of events that occurred 
there.  The procedural pathway to the final disposition for 
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Breakiron, however, must follow strict guidelines.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s judgment to 
the extent that it denied Breakiron’s habeas petition as to his 
robbery conviction and remand with an instruction to grant 
his petition as to that conviction for the reasons explained in 
this opinion. 
